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10:30:07 – Launched from B-52 at 45,000 ft. altitude with all systems 
operating normally, the pilot ignited the boost rocket, and the X-15-3 
accelerated into a steep climb.  
10:31:07 – at about 90,000’, arcing from the motor drive of the traversing 
probe caused an electrical disturbance to the aircraft’s electrical system that 
continued until 10:33:53.  Noise begins in all telemetered data channels. 
10:31:28 -  Major Adams reported IFDS computer- and the instrument-
malfunction lights. Ground Control acknowledged report. (& 10:31:58) 
10:31:34 – Pilot switched ADI to PAI mode and switched source of data for 
α and β as well as for altitude and velocity from the nose ball to IFDS and 
IMU  (while the malfunction lights were still on).  
10:31:40 to 10:32:00 – Executed wing-rock maneuver; exceeded specified 
bank angles started a slow yaw drift to the right.   
10:32:08 to 10:32:23 – Executed the computed α/β-check maneuver.  
10:32:50 – Initiated the Precision Attitude-Tracking Task   
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10:32:51 -  The Flight Controller reported to pilot, “Over the top at about 261”.  
Key	Events	During	Flight	3-65	(conInued)	
10:33:01 - The Flight Controller told the pilot that he was looking “real 
good”.  
10:33:05 – The pilot switched to direct control of the RCS using the left side 
stick.  Major Adams continued to try to complete execution of the precision 
attitude-tracking task.  
10:33:25 - The Flight Controller once again assured the pilot that he was “a 
little bit high,” but in “real good shape.”  
10:33:39 - The pilot reported that the aircraft control seemed "squirrelly.”  
10:34:01 - Major Adams said, “I’m in a spin.”  (& 10:34:16) 
10:34:30 – After three revolutions, the aircraft came out of the spin and went 
into a 45-degree inverted dive.  
10:34:37 - the MH-96 AFCS entered into a limit-cycle instability forcing 
control surfaces into rapid, cyclic oscillation to their limit of travel at their 
maximum rate of 26o per second.  
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10:34:54 - The aircraft began to break up.  
10:34:58 - The largest pieces impacted the ground   
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Time	Line	of	CriIcal	Events	Prior	to	Spin		
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Causal	Factors	of	the	X-15-3	Accident	
A Latent Causal Factor of the Flight 3-65 accident was 
management’s failure to require environmental testing of 
experimental equipment before it was installed on the aircraft.  
A Proximate Causal Factor was the confluence of the failures of 
 1. the aircraft system design and  
 2. ground control  
to alert the pilot to the possibility of control problems and 
















10:30:45 – “We have you right on track, on the profile.”  
10:31:13 - “Okay, right on track.”  
10:31:21 - “On profile, on heading.”  
10:31:50 – “On heading, on profile.”  
10:32:19 - “Right on the track.”  
10:32:43 - “You are looking real good, right on the heading, Mike.”  
10:33:01 - “Your heading is going in the right direction, Mike, real good.”  
10:33:25 – “A little bit high, Mike, but real good shape.” 
10:34:01 – Pilot reports “I am in a spin!”  










1. The design of the adaptive gain control in the MH-96 allowed a failure in 
the AFCS to interfere with the pilot’s ability to control the aircraft.  
2. The design of the pilot’s interface with the MH-96 AFCS was very complex 
and difficult to understand. 
3. The MH-96 AFCS had a known tendency to go into limit-cycle oscillations 
when the system was operating at or close to maximum gain.  
4. The pilot’s display used a single critical instrument, the Attitude Director 
Indicator, in two different modes; one a normal mode used most of the time, 
the other a mode (Precision Attitude Indicator) that was used only 
occasionally.  
5. There was no provision for backup source of reliable information for the 
pilot at high altitude when the IFDS computer malfunctioned.  
25	
ContribuIng	Factors	to	the	X-15-3	Accident	(cont.)	
6. Major Adams failed to correct the error in yaw when he switched to direct 
control of the RCS through the left side stick.  
7. Evidence suggests that Major Adams’ responses to the PAI were consistent 
with an ADI mode when he switched to the left-hand stick control of the RCS.  
8. Evidence indicates that Major Adams forgot to disengage the MH-96 AFCS 
as he was supposed to when he switched to the left side stick control.  
9. A speculation in the AIB  report and elsewhere was that Major Adams’ 
susceptibility to Type II Spatial Disorientation was a Contributing Factor in the 
scenario of this accident.  
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Conclusions	
1. The electrical disturbance due to arcing of unqualified experimental 
equipment precipitated the accident. 
2. The pilot had no reliable control during the electrical disturbance.  
3. The pilot was, very likely, unable to recognize the control problems. 
4. Flight 3-65 would have very likely been recoverable, if ground control had 
aborted the mission when they had clear indications of malfunctions.  
5. The focus of Major Adam’s attention on performing the precise wing-rock 
maneuver using an intermittent RCS may have distracted him from noticing 
the yaw angle acquired during the boost phase.  
27	
Conclusions	(cont.)	
7. The pilot’s ability to manage the aircraft’s various malfunctions when he 
switched to direct control was affected by an extremely high workload 
perhaps exacerbated by Spatial Disorientation at that particular moment.  
8. The limit-cycle oscillations of controls would have been prevented had 
Major Adams disengaged the MH-96 AFCS when he switched to manual 
control. 
 
9. The destruction of the X-15-3 was due to the structural loads produced by 
the high frequency limit-cycle oscillations of the control surfaces induced by 
the AFCS.  
 
6. There was no evidence that Spatial Disorientation degraded Major Adam’s 
performance during the boost phase or the execution of the experimental 
maneuvers.  
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Thank	you!	
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